Idealism is a fundamental concept in philosophy, of which the main characteristic is that the mental process or consciousness is viewed as primary. or determining, in relation to reality or the material world. In opposition to idealism are the different varieties of realistic or materialistic philosophy, in which the mental is conceived of as something secondary, or derived. in relation to reality or the material world. Some researchers and philosophers are proclaimed idealists. but it is far more common that researchers do not consider themselves to be idealists. nor do they assume a consciously idealistic point of departure (and. for example. view the clash between idealism and materialism as an irrelevant issue), but in their thinking inadvertently fall into idealistic modes of thought. In the field of library and information science this is indeed the case, for example, as regards the concept of 'subject matter'. A worthwhile critique of mentalistic (and thereby idealistic) tendencies in 'information retrieval' theory has recently been published by Frohmann [2] .
My own attempts at clarification of information science are in definiti'"'e ways identical to Frohmann's point of departure. An idealistic concept of subject matter encompasses that a 'subject' is an 'idea'. either in an objective (i.e . Platonic) sense. or in a more subjective sense.
In this section we will look more closely at subjective-idealistic concepts of 'subject'; in the next section, the objective-idealistic will be considered.
Subjective idealism takes concepts and subjects to be the expression of the perceptions or views of one or more individuals (subjects). Concepts and I a1 I /-r JOURNAL OF DOCUMENTATION vol.48. no. 2 subjects are that which is subjectively comprehended or understood by them. The key to the concept of subject therefore lies in the study of the minds of some people, for example, the authors or users of documents. From the point of view of epistemology, subjective idealism is characterised by making perception and thinking independent in a subjectivistic manner. Positivism is the most common representative of subjective idealism.
If the issue is the subject matter of a book, there are many possibilities: the author's version (often as expressed in the title or the text, either implicitly or explicitly), the reader's version (great variation is possible here), the publisher's version, as often indicated in a series title (for example 'European Monographs in Social Psychology'), and the librarian's version, which may well be expressed in terms of the library's classification. Bente Ahlers Msller [3] has published a brief paper in which she compares classification of the same books by the system used at the State and University Library in Aarhus, Denmark, with the Dewey Decimal classification. This demonstrates that there can be amazing differences between subjective perceptions of what the subjects of the books are. But this subjectivity may well be extremely well-founded: subjectivitlt is not noise or error, it is a consistent and thoroughly underpinned analytical tendency. We are not merely speaking of the different structures which different classification systems give to subjects (i.e. more or less suMivision), but unequivocal differences in the conception ofthe subject ofa book, where one view places a book under the subject'books', and another view places the same book under the subject 'trade'.
In connection with subjective idealism special consideration is given to the intentions of the author, his view of its subject, and what new things he has to relate. This has given rise to the concept of 'aboutness' in library and information science literature, an interest which in my view represents a blind alley, an attempt to escape from the difficulties in the concept of subject (Note l). Devotees of the concept'aboutness'assign to it special clarity and significance in the analysis of subjects. but are evidently unaware of its epistemological position as subjective-idealistic. With regard to the subjective-idealistic theory of 'subject marter' I will demonstrate that neither the author's, the reader's, librarian'slinformation specialist's nor any other person's (for example the publisher's) points of view or subjective understanding can have any certain or objective knowledge about the subject ofa document, nor define the concept of'subject'. Each of these viewpoints can contribute something to a determination of the subject. but the subjective-idealistic conception of subject over-emphasises certain aspects of the document either from the author's, the reader's or an interpreter's point of view. l. A book can -but need not -contain an assertion of what its subject is. The author can explicitly discuss the subject of his work, for example in the introduction, and he may note its relation to other subjects. If a book is called 'general psychology' it may contain a discussion of'what is general psychology?'. Since the basis ofpsychology is a complex theorerical problem. the author's views need naturally not be true, merely the t74 June 1992 THEORY OF'SUBJECT' expression of his more or less well-founded (subjective) ideas. Thal-which is psychology for some may -after theoretical. co.nsiderations -prove rather to be ili.l;d;.
physiology. The book may not deal at all with that which the author thinks it does, nor with what the title indicates.
Just as often, however, a work does not contain any explicit discussion ofits subject' .fn" t iri".y "i dyna*ic psychiatry' assumes implicitly that psychoanalysis is part of .Ji".l science tis'ctriatiyi and nbt of psychology. Much can_ be said about this. but in" gi""n f"U"t oia given book need not be correct. A book need not 6eat the subject of psychiatry because it saYs it does. ' 'e tr"fi scientific anaiysis of the subjects of documents for databases would have to assume certain coniistent definitions, which would sometimes, but by no means always, be in agreement with the version of the subject given in the document itself. 2. With regard to the ruer, a document can be ordered with the user's conceptual structures;d subject perceptions in mind. The user may well have his subjective grasp of what the subject of the book is.
Some information retrieval theorists apPear to work from the premise that an information retrieval system ought to ordeisubjects according to each user's subjective reading. They are initinea to build on psychological investigations of the users' p"iopi.nr of the subject. their 'knowledge structures'. There are also examples of Inn".iigutlor,, carried out on such a basis is clearly an example of this). ,{. related mode of consideration is, for example, Belkin's nsr model [6-81. Though J.E. Farradane [9, l0l assumes an explicit psychological.approach within [brar! and information scienceliterature, a closer interpretation of his work seems to implymore an objective than a subjective-idealistic model ' We claim that there are types of information systems which ctearly ought to aim to taltoi ttri description of the iubjects to the user's subjective perceptions.. Examples of this are library systems for children or pedagogical systems in whic.h^a point of a.f"rtu.. and'a goal can be described foi both a learning process and for advising studenS. Both iypes expr€ss a certain paternalism, i.e. someone assumes the responsibility for-ihe direction of others' information searches. This is done by pi"'rur"ing to create the connections between given documents and the user's subject 'universe, -i.e.
undertaking to interpret the subjects or information content ol the Joc,rmer,ts from a psychJlogical or pedagogical evaluation ofneeds and goals.
Aside from such paternaliitic approaches, should subject descriptions then take the psychology of the user into account? Yes, in a certain way this is indeed desirable' ittio.rn"ti"ott retrieval systems should be made user-friendly, and this can be done by ilaving knowledge of ih. use.'s language and subjective perceptions.. and use this knowiedge, for eiample in see references to the preferred terms. So perhaps it is even the ideal, that all systems in a certain way relate to the users. But this does not mean that one int"rp."6ih. subject content ofdocuments based on knowledge ol the users' subjective perteptions, bui that these perceptions are employed to create the necessary refe-rcnces and instructions, i.e. to make the system user-friendly. In my opinion the question ofuser-friendliness is not tre central theoretical issue in information retrieval. 'ihe central issue is knowledge-representation, how to represent the knowledge in documents. The question of user-friendliness is a cognitive-ergonomic question that must be implemented in a system, but is of secondary interest compared to the adequate representation of knowledge in databases.
Scientific information systems muit in my opinion presuppose that the .user acq uires the categories, terminology and classifications of science, scholarship and information systems]rather than the riverse. The adoption ofthe user's categories and terminology Ly *i.o* and its information systems is a job for popularisation. n-ot primarily for information science. Reference ij often made to using the pnnciples of psychology and linguistics for system design, but such principles olten p_resent dilemmas or contradictions in contrast to purely disciplinary considerations. Our conclusion here is 175 JOURNAL OF DOCUM ENTATION vol.48, no. 2 that he who seeks the key to the concept oJ"subject' in the mind of the user commits an error of PsYchologism. 3. n tfrird subjeitive conception can be expressed by the librarian.or information ,r"r*t*t in a sub.lect description oldocuments in a database. In the best instances a ;i;;;; i, used (ofLlassrficati,on, a thesaurus or something else) which makes possible a rt'igtr o.gr." of explicit and consistent basis for analysis. As demonstrated (for example inivf rf fEr [3]), dilierent sysrems employ different (subjective) principles of analysis and thereby determinations olsubjects-This situation will not be further documented here. since it makes up a significant part of the argument in the section on materialistic theory of subjeit maiter. I will here merely establish that both the individual information wbrker and the different lR systems display considerable vanations rn itr.ir O"r.riptions of the subjects of given documents. To the extent that this iutl"ctluity is made a quality of the subject concept itself. I am talking about a subjective-idealistic conceptton.
Thus it is typical of the subjective-idealistic conception of subject that it over-emphasises certain aspects of the document either from the author's, the reader's or an interpreter's point of view. Insofar as no subjective instance in its role relative to the document can guarantee a correct analysis of subject matter, that analysis always is subjective. this can lead to an agnoslic conception of 'subiect': it is impossible to say what a subject is, and how it is to be deiermined. Renouncing an exact determination of one of the basic concepts of library and information science is a questionable matter. We do not think that such agnosticism as Patrick Wilson expresses in the above citations is an acceptable solution. As we shall see later, it r.r possible to define subjects. But it is not possible to determine subjects by examining the minds of authors, users or any other specific group of people. To do this would be a kind of 'mentalism'. The subjective-idealistic subject theory viewed subjects as subjective categories, for which person X and person Y each had his own subjective grasp of the subject of a given document. (These subjective categories may be more or less identical -this is another issue; the principle is that they are individual. dependent on a subjective conception.) Objective idealism does not consider a subject as subjective in this way: persons X and Y will -if they perform correct analysis -arrive at the same subject for a given document, the subject of which can then be termed objective (at least in a particular meaning of the word). Whereas subjective idealism in general is characterised by over-emphasis on the perceptions of the senses, objective ideaiism tends to over-emphasise certain aspects of theoretical analysts and make them absolute.
The idealistic conception indicates that a subject is a designation ofan idea. In Ranganathan's system this is made explicit. as cited by one of his students. Gopinath:
'subject -an organised body of ideas, whose extension and intension are likely to fall coherently within the field of interests and comfortably within the intellectual competence and the field of inevitable speciaiisation of a normal person'; and: 'A subject is an organised and To elucidate more closely the view which objective idealism takes of the concept of the subject, we will start by looking at its view of concepts in general. Objective idealism (as represented, for example, by Plato or scholastic realism) considers a concept to be an abstract psychic or mental entity (an idea), which exists in and of itseli and the relationship of this to concrete things is such that these things share in the mental entities which represent them via the concept. Realism (in the above meaning) considers. in other words, that general concepts represent something universal, which exists outside and independent of the human consciousness, and which at the same time exists prior to separate things (originally with reference to God. today rather a form of a priori cognition in a Kantian sense).
Translated into the terms of the problem of 'subject'. this means that the concrete documents share in the'ideas' expressed in a given subject. These ideas exist outside the human consciousness (or within it as u priori perceptions) and are also prior to the individual concepts expressed in the individual documents. These ideas or subjects have universal or fixed properties; they can once and for all be analysed in a universal system. or separated into individual parts. This theoretical point of departure still has a far-reaching influence in today's theories about subjects which can be traced from the views of 2.7 Absolute svntax of ideas a subject is largely the product of human thinking. lt presents an organized pattern of ideas created by the specialists in any field of inquiry. Working at the near-seminal level and postulating about helpful sequence among the facets and isolates has /ed to the conjecture that there may be an 'absolute s-v-ntax' among the constituents of the subjects within a basic subject, perhaps parallel to the sequence of thought process itself, irrespective of the language in which the ideas may be expressed, irrespective of the cultural hackground or other diferences in the environments in which the specialists, as creators as well as the users of the subject, ma1' be placed . . . (emphasis added).
This view. that human thought, human language, human consciousness, the human subject universe has an 'absolute syntax', i.e. that it is fundamentally independent of the functional context of the mental processes, is a pattern of the idealistic conception, a direct contrast to the view that the mental processes are tools. formed by and suited to the tasks and conditions in which they llnction. Since there is no question of person X and person Y having different 'syntax', this is an objective, not a subjective. idealism.
Objective idealism expresses itself in its classification process with the view that classification of documents can be done independently of the context in which classification is being used. The'syntax'in Ranganathan's system is the pMEsr formula (Personality, Matter, Energy, Space, Time). Gopinath It is my claim that this type of analysis, which determines the priorities of the viewpoints to be taken on a document, is not optimal in every situation. One can imagine researchers working on technical aspects of the election process who wish to compare them in several countries. For such a person the election would be the central subject, and it would be inconvenient if this were a subtopic of History and India. (Computer searching has to a large degree made fixed sequences among facets superfluous; the problem only remains for printed catalogues and other one-dimensional ordering systems, but that is another issue.)
It is indeed our claim that an objective idealist conc€pt of subject matter tends towards subject descriptions which only have an abstract relationship to the needs for subject description and the contexts in which they are used. because such descriptions are based on the a priori given properties ofideas. One can also expreis this as that subjects are viewed as 'innate properties' in things or doc,r-.ntr. This is a consequence of the theory's concept of objective ideai, separated from the individual items of reality. In other words, this is also un .*pr.rrion of objective idealism's special conception of the relationship betweln the general and the particular: that the general exists outside and independent of the particular. This is in contrast to the concept that a subject only exists in specific documents, and that every subject description contains an analysis with its point of departure within the very contexts of its use. which is to be examined more closely below. The idealistic concept of 'subject' has furthermore the consequence lhat neither the world views nor the academic disciptinary and political priorities expressed in information s.vstems are reco'gnised,which has been criticised by Steiger [20] , among others' ti sum up: the objective-idealistic point of view does not -as did the subjective-idealistic viiwpoint -match the concept of subject in the minds of so*e people. Instead it presumes that some kind of abstract analysis or fixed proceduri could be used to penetrate the surface of documents, thereby revealing their true subjects. As we shall see later, no such fixed procedure can guarantee a correct subject analysis. Among other things, this approach lacks lonsideration of the pragmatic aspects of subjects: the potential use of the documents.
PRAGMATIC CONCEPT OF SUBJECT MATTER
A user has a particular (specific) need for information. a problem to be solved for which inflrmation is required. This information is searched for in libraries or databases in which documents (carriersiconveyors of information) are registered bY subiect.
-The ,egisiration of subjects by librarians or information specialists mustfor the pio".r, to be meaningful -anticipate the needs of the user: it must make it possible for the user to find that for which he is searching. Subject data in libraries and information systems have an instrumental or pragmatic function. As Bookstein and Swanson [21] write:
'documents are indexed for the purpose of retrieval, and one can arrive at a theoretically well-founded procedure for indexing by being true to that purpose'' Dagobert Soegel [22] has introduced a distinction between'content oriented indexing' and 'request oriented indexing' which has proved most stimulating in my piritosopnising on the concept of subject. Whether Soergel reaily inu.nt.i'request oriented indexing'or just the name has not been investigated here. He points out that it is only the first of these which is described in library and information science literature, and that the second is hardly known in theory, though examples do exist in practice (for example the database Ringiok, which descrites chemical literature in a different way from Chemical Abstracts, because Ringdok pays special attention to the needs of the pharmaceutical industrY).
content_oriented indexing is a description of subjects which has to be conceived as purely ^ ;;;ffi; of ttre atiributes of the document: as in the observation that ,thls i"""*. [n other words, these atlases (or the concept of bibliometri. rinr.,ng "ni-."-.itlti""l ur. impricit e^pr.srions of a concept of 'subject' in which a prior r".,""Tli"ril;;"i relationship (as reflected in citation practrce)
;ttffi*:i1ilff:*ll]ll'"lemethod orsearching fo.r lilerlture lllch,has tak11rt1 place in the system, ;;;hith has its advanmges ind disadvantages' It occuptes a niche: ir is not a question of merely mapping ,r1i-prro, instrumental.connections and thereby produci's o poi'''ihedicine for iii"o'u'i "'o'ching' nor reducing the concept of "r'i l"liilr, rc thise empirical relationships' Several reasons play'a ioie in ttris. First,.a potential instrumental relationship cannot be extracted iro,,' u pn-o."irr,."*.n,uf .ituiion. tn information science'.the literature abour .teleco**un,."lionJ';;t t linted (co-cited) with the literature on .informationretrieval',becau.setelecommuntcationsatacertainstageoIdevelopment was a crucial problem for information ..,.,"ui"Su,-u, " fuitt timJ' the problems of telecommunicutionr.n"i U" ,.guiJ.J "r,"ui"f , unOittit bibliographic linking may be a bad expressio. "i ';;i;;--''?r^"otttt sl;;J' certain ionditions' cultural or sociologicalwithintheresearchenvironm.ent.skewthepicture.inso|arasthemost eoistemologicu[v r..tjr" ao"urn.nt, u.. otten not cited ai much as those documents which easiiy lead to .on.r.,. investigations t,ttui it ,o say, there is overemphasis on empiricism). A third ""J n""r ,"u,oni. thata.particular document most often contatnS essentiallv different d;#ii;il;;iil '1tt]i1 it is useful to catesorise in other wavs from that to which a purely use-onenteo,Practice would lead' For example' many psychologic_al investigations cite statistical urri-*.,ttooological literature as well as lirerature o, orr.no,fff;i.J;;;: ri *"tra u" expedieni to operate with these as different sublects, even rhough-rhey upp.ur,og;,h"riitirougir bibliometric links) within the psychological literature ol a gtven penos'
Pragmaticsubjecttheoryrunsintootherdifficulties:ifitisassumedthata given document is to fe inctuded in relation to all its possible uses. then this wouldgivensetoalltoonumerousrepetitionsormultipleclassifications.In rhe above.*"*ptJ*iii rutfn.rrl. acidit would be impossible for a universai library to classify ;;iil;" acid under all its potential uses' Therefore Soergel,s .on..p,'of ..'q.r.r, oriented.inJexing is indeed significant, and for specialised informaiion services it is importait to classify according to the need of the target group' June 1992
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Of course the problem with a pragmatic concept of the subject lies in the most basic sense in the condition it shares with pragmatic philosophy: even though the goal is to develop human practice. a narrow practice-orientation is too short-sighted and superficial in its truth criteria. Pragmatism contains no profound criteria for significance that can give direction to indicating the priority of the properties of a document. A cow can be described both zoologically as a mammal and pragmatically as a domestic animal or livestock. Dalhberg [23, p. l9a] designates the last relation as the relation between man and object. but assigns to the first another type, namely 'ontological'. We are not in agreement in this absolute distinction: all cognition is fundamentally instrumental for man. The concept of 'domestic animal' has a more immediate connection to human practice, whereas the concept 'mammal' is an abstraction with a less immediate relation to human practice. Classification of a book on cows in the subject category 'mammals' or in 'domestic animals' is not dependent on the most significant property ofthe book (the cenral object is a cow in both cases). It depencis basically on the evaluation of whether the book is of most use to people looking for literature under zoology or agriculture, i.e. whether the book is of most use to a biologist or a farmer. This is a judgement based on the properties of the book in relation to perception of interests in an epistemological sense. This judgement is perhaps made primarily on the basis of the content of the book, but when subject description is intended for another target group, other decisions would be made (cf. this example with Chemical Abstracts and Ringdok).
Abstract and general knowledge of biology and the other sciences have clearly demonstrated their significance for man, even though their designation of useful functions is less immediate than 'domestic animal'. Scientific systematisation and terminology provide a topical organisation of knowledge which on a superior level assures the most effective communication in the development of human knowledge. Such an organisation of knowledge is difficult to justify from a pragmatic philosophy, in the usual understanding of this concept in philosophy.
Even though pragmatic subject theory has its limitations, it makes an important contribution to perception of central properties of the concept of the subject by pointing out its means-goal nature (and thus repudiating the view of subjects as 'inherent qualities'; subjects are no more inherent qualities than is the value of a thing). This is supported by the etymology of 'subject' (especially in the Scandinavian languages, but also in English and German, see Note 2). 'subject' (Scandinavian: 'emne') means 'raw material', among other things.
Iron is a subject for the smith. A cow is a subject for the zoologist and the farmer. Epistemology is a subject for the philosopher and the information researcher. A subject thus is always a subject for someone or for something.
A REALIST/MATERIALIST SUBJECT THEORY
According to the realistic and the materialistic viewpoint things exist objectively and encompass objective properties. This is a crucial point of departure which is to be taken for granted in this article (see Note 3). In this paper, no efforts will be made to illuminate the differences between 'scientific realism' and'materialism'. [24] , in which he refers to books as 'objective knowledge', and operates with thought experiments very similar to mine. However, my concept of the objectivity of documents is not borrowed from Popper, and there are great differences between them because Popper's theoretical base is dualism and mine is monism. There is no spa@ here to evaluate Popper's theory in relation to mine. It is controversial and has been seriously criticised both in philosophy and in information science (as to the latter, see Rudd [25] ).
What is to be understood by the properties of a document?
In the broadest sense, the properties ofa document are every true statement that can be said about that document. A document can describe the achievements of Christian the Fourth, state the melting points of metals, present information on the composition of food additives and their consequences for human health, investigate the unicorn as a psychoanalytical symbol etc. The properties mentioned here can be said to deal with a document's reflection, representation or treatment of a part of reality (or of human consciousness and imagination). Which aspect of reality it reflects (its'aboutness') is one of a document's central properties. It is also significant how it treats or reflects reality, for example whether its claims are true or false, representative. superficial or fundamental etc. A category of properties may be termed relational: how is this document related to other documents? Does it elaborate, overlap, correct or make other documents superfluous? Documents can be characterised by their language, form, type, etc., which often represent lesser properties (cf. Hjorland [26] ). And finally, documents can be characterised by type of paper, binding, typography etc., which in most cases would be insignificant, but for special purposes (the history of the book) may be central properties. The properties o[ a document emerge especially in the use of a document, for example by reading the document in connection with a particular activity (research. education or other). The frequency and structure of the words used. i.e. the language expressed in the document, also belong among the properties of the document. These latter properties do not normally appear directly through reading a document. but, for example, through processing it for automated functions, searching or automated indexing, classification etc. I will end discussion of these latter properties here, even though they do naturally play a large role in information science literature. The language in which the document is expressed plays a large practical role in information searching, because these elements often are accessible for searching, either in full text bases (still the exception), or in the form of representation of parts of the text in databases, usually the titles and abstracts. I will pass over this problem here. I am in agreement with Spang-Hanssen [27, p. 20] that a document's content cannot be described in depth merely by a formalisation of its language.
I have now provided a brief definition of the properties of a document. Now we must consider to what extent the properties ofa document can be described objectively.
Curiously enough, objectivity means two different things in relation to judging the properties of a book (described here according to the realistic epistemology): I . independent of the subject who apprehends; 2. in agreement with reality. In the first of these senses, the more readers who identify these same properties with the book, the t82 June 1992 THEORY OF'SUBJECT' higher the objectivity. In the sense of in agreement with reality', the relationship is inversely proportionai. Since special qualifications are necessary to be able to identify the significant prop€rties in a scientific book, perhaps only a limited group can grasp the full potential of a work. In other words, the properties easily identified by the many will often be the less significant (or the more indiscriminate), and thus less objective in the second sense of this word. (This situation is especially the case in basic research, where theoretical re-orientations take place. In more everyday contexts, the 'normal proc€ss of research' (in the Kuhnian sense), this expressed contrast between the two objectivity requirements need not obtain).
To repeat: there is a direct contast between the two concepts of objectivitl, in the evaluation of a book's most signifcant properties and thereby its subjects. The solution of this problem is not a decision by majority. The solution is an explicit argumentation and, if not a provision of proof. at least an establishing of a probability. We have seen that the description itself of the properties of a document is not a simple thing, susceptible to automation, but that it is highly dependent on particular conditions (which olten are of a theoretical nature). When we maintain that the properties of a document are objective, even though the description ofthem requires special subjective prerequisites. this implies that reality, the testing of the document in practice. will in the final analysis decide its informative potential. no matter how many earlier misconceptions have been made. History becomes the final judge of the objectivity of statements about the properties of a document. (And even though history will rarely finally decide this, we retain the concept of objective properties in documents which are the basis of our attempts to analyse them.) Different properties of documents can have different meanings for different purposes or scientific disciplines. Scientific disciplines or theories can have different foci or different epistemological interests. Therefore there can be marked differences in identifying central properties of documents. An identification of properties from a narrow theoretical point of view is more pragmatic than a more general perspective. Identification of the properties of documents from a superior or general point of view presupposes an ability to evaluate the potentials of different theories, that is it presupposes more a philosophical perspective. Library and information science personnel with a deep degree of subject knowiedge and with expertise in searching databases and evaluating searches done for professionals, do often have important prerequisites for identifying such generai properties.
Subjects and the properties of documents. In philosophical usage the documents represent the individual variable and their properties and relations the predicates (together the properties and relations are termed the logical attributes of the document).
The examples mentioned of the properties of a document (the part of reality with which it deals. its truth value, its method etc.) make up predicates of the first degree (or first order predicates), just as does its lexical structure. etc.
When a librarian or information specialist categorises documents with a subject description, it is these predicates of the first degree with which he interacts: either by reading the book. or by inspecting its lexical structure (and in the extreme case he can construct a computer program that categorises documents from this structure). On the basis of this analysis of the first degree predicates of the document. he assigns it a predicate of the second degree, a predicate predicate (see Note 4). An assignment of a subject is thus afunction of Viewing the subject as a function of the properties of a document in this way does not in itself say what the subject is. Despite this, the predicate concept clanfies the relationship between the subject of a document and its other attributes (see Note 6).
To determine the concept of subject we must concern ourselves with which properties of documents enter into a subject description, and in what wa.,-they play this part. In practice it is often an extremely simple thing to say what the subject is (cf. the naive concept of the subject): designation ofa subject often merely requires pointing out one or a few significant properties in a document, in particular the conditions in the real world that the document reflects. If the document has the property that it treats the building style of Christian the Fourth, then the document can be assigned the subject predicate'Christian the Fourth's building style'. In this example there is an apparent identity between what we have defined as a property of the document and its subject. but since a choice has been made among the theoretically infinitely many properties, the subject description is in principie not identical with the predicates of the first order of the document. An explanation is lacking for why just this property, in just this case. has been selected as the subject. In other words. we must look more closely at this subject function (see Note 7).
Which properties of the document enter into the subject description? As emphasised above. very often in practice rather simple and hard properties form the basis of subject anaiysis. Theoretically, however, this becomes extremely complicated, and as soon as an attempt is made to exclude a property, a hypothetical example pops up in which just that property would be part of determining a subject. The authorship of a document is hardly part of analysing the subject? Yes, in the case ofautobiographies (and as Boserup [28] indicates, also hypothetically in other situations). I will not attempt to demonstrate here that all properties of documents enter into the subject function or to eliminate those which do not. My point of departure is that there is not a well defined or definable portion of the properties of documents which enter into the analysis of the subject (and that just exactly this situation leads to Patrick Wilson's agnostic concept of subject matter).
In the same way I would make the claim that the subject function cannot be a previously fixed procedure at analysing properties, such as Ranganathan's pMEsT formula attempts to set up. It is my opinion that exactly the choice of specific properties of documents or specific functions of these properties inevitably leads down the idealistic path. Since librarians and information specialists would very much like to have clear and firm directives and procedures. an idealistic tendency continually lurks in the wings within the conception of the subject itself. (But of course in the concrete development of information systems procedures must be described, for example in the use of classification systems and thesauri. and I myself in another connection have been a spokesman for definite and explicit procedure (checklists) in the description of subjects [29] ).
June 1992 THEORY OF'SUBJECT'
My point of departure for a materialistic theory of the subject lies in the pragmatic conception of the subject presented earlier. Subjects build on an evaluation o[ the documents' properties with regard to optimising the potential perception of the document. Which properties of documents are relevant. and which analytical functions are to be instituted with regard to these properties is not given a priori, but is, inter alia, dependent on context (see also Note l0). subjects in themselves must thus be definedas the epistemological potentials oJ documents. A potential is a rather intangible property -hence the problem with defining subjects. But the potential of a thing is not a subjective or objective 'idea'. A potential is an objective possibility. uranium held its potential as an atomic fuel before science was aware of these possibilities. and many authors have been buried before the significant potential of their work has been recognised. which things and works have which potentials is determined by the current stage of society's development. At one stage uranium is a not particularly valuable metal withour special potential. At another stage it is an important energy source. and at a third stage it is perhaps something else again. This is to sav that it is the level of development of human society, the human practice, that constitutes a subject (see Note 8).
Thus a subject description of a document is in one or another way an expression of the epistemological potentials of the document, such as these appear to one who describes the subject. The better the description predicts the potentials of the document, the more correct, more objective, the description of the subject is. The understanding of this should become more clear by reading the concrete example analysed in the appendix to this article. However. an interpretation of a given description of a subject must involve the qualifications (and interests) of the person who has carried out the subject descnption. When Patrick Wilson Il l, p. 92] wrote (with regard to what the user can expect to find within a particular location in a library's classification system): 'for nothing definite canbe expected of the things found at any given position', this is only correct from this subjective prerequisite. we can affirm with the adherents of hermeneutics that perception of the potential of documents depends onthe pre-understanding of the person who carries out the determination of the subject. In contrast to many adherents to hermeneutics. I, however, wish to retain the concept of the objective potential or subjects of documents.
A subject description is thus a prognosis of future potentials. This prognosis can be based on positive as well as negative judgements. The subject description can be seen as both a kind ofvision and as an evaluation in relation to current research. The most important prerequisite in subject description is not a special kind of method. but is maturity in judgement.
The use of subject systems thus also assumes interpretation. The user must enter into the universe of the system and its devising. This is hardly exceptional. In some cases documents are ordered by the so-called 'principle of provenance'. which requires that documents remain in the collections and the order in which they were originally organised. This requires an insight into JOURNAL OF DOCUMENTATION vol. 48, no. 2 the organisation that existed when the collection was established' Ordenng of documentsandknowledgeisalwaysbasedonparticularpremises'world ui.*r, urrn-ptions. Knoiledge of these premises is often necessary to obtain "
."tirf".tory return from descriptions of subjects' The necessary.degree of interpretation depends upon the extent to which the subject description has unti.iput.a and met the needs of the user. In the principle of provenance only a io* o.gr." of anticipation is attempted. because the principle makes no attempi to consider the current user's context. In contrast, the abovementioned pharmacology Ringdok database exhibits a high degree of accommodation of user needs. Information systems which take into account the needs of the users are more expensive to establish and maintain, but are in return economical of resources in use'
A description of a subject is rarely presented as a direct statement about the potential oi a document; more often it appears in the form of a reference to an academic discipline ('the subject is psychology'), i.e.a socially defined problem area. within *hi.h th. document particularly contributes to problem-solving' As previously mentioned. subjects can also be expressed indirectly, by merely emphasising special qualities (-'treats the architecture of christian IV'), which can also be iocated in a discipline (history, art history) or which serve directly as the base from which the user himself evaluates the subject of the document (for example'tourist attractions')'
The issues of the expression of subjects, of information retrieval languages' and of representation in text go beyond the framework of this article' But since these issues presuppose a knowledge ofwhat subjects are, the proposed theory of .subject' presented here is a prerequisite for more profound theories on these questtons.
we can now return to Patrick wilson's problem regarding the'ill-defined phenomena' oi""itrorr. A designation of a subject reflects the clarity or imprecision of a document' but not in the way mentioned uy witson. The purpose of analysing the.subject is to J.t.r-in. whether a document has an epistemological potential in relation to future users of a given ."t.gory or a given .on..pt, forixample 'hostilitY'..1f it does' it is classified under that.on..pt. ifiot. then it is not put there' 1lf.it is put there in order to illuminate rhe unclear i.rtiir"fg' in the lield. thii could also be regarded as a kind of inio*u,iu. porenrial, even of i more indirect kind.) Assignment of a. subject to a do"urn.nt is indeed a clear ludgement that 'this document has epistemological ootenrial within "hostility" ',-even though this clear judgement is.based on many i.ii-C.r"ii"rr oi *it.ttr.r or not the document actually contributed to this subject' because lt was rmpreclt. ln ltt use ofconcepts. In actual practice-other possibilities do often exist, preferable from an ideal point of_ui"*. for example characterization of the methods or theoretrcal approach olihe work, which well may give the work a higher ;;;;t;l; a darabase depending on its s.tructure; in other words decisions on the subject of a document are not iypically an 'all or nothing' judgement (see Note l0).
Subiec ts and e PistemologY Documentsaresources|orthecognitiveprocessjustaspeople,things' processes. statements etc. aiso are sources of human cognition. How man achieves knowledge preoccupies epistemologists. Part of human cognitive activity (an importani specialcase) is scientific cognition, which in addition to June 1992 THEORY OF'SUBJECT' epistemology also buiids on the theory of science and the methodologies of academic disciPlines. Various types of epistemology exist, for example idealism (positivism), scientific realism and materialism. It lies outside the scope of this article to sketch or treat epistemology itself. The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of subject, and with that objective in mind it is necessary to view the determination of subject from an epistemoiogical point of view. This follows in particular from the conciusion of the previous section: that a determination of a subject is an evaluation of and assignment of priorities to the properties of a document with regard to a categorisation and a subject description of that document. How this categorisation and description go on is decisive for the 'visibility' of the document in libraries and databases, and thereby for its potential role in future development of knowledge.
The most generalised knowledge about how a person, for instance a researcher. or a whole discipline, ought to examine the worid in order to expand human knowledge is lodged in philosophical epistemology. Therefore I conclude that insofar as such a theory is at all able to produce useful results. this theory also is the foundation for the determination of the subjects of documents.
If a researcher poses a particular question, for instance about apes, or the origins of life, it is the hypotheses and formulation of the question which are primary. What methods may be used to investigate the question"'empirical', or'theoretical analysis' or'library investigations' (i.e. a search for literature), are secondary. The clarifying ofthe question and the central concepts involved would be the same at a certain level. The question determines which things, processes. documents etc. are relevant to the study, and how they are relevant. Another issue is, to what extent the relevant documents can be identified. It is my claim that it is extremely difficult to identify the most relevant documents in modern science (cf. Hjsrland [29] for an analysis oi this problem with a case study). The effect of this identification being so difficult is that the theoretical basis of information systems assumes the status of an important scientific problem. The description of the subject of a document (i.e" the evaluation. issignment of priorities and the consequent categorisation of the potentiais of the document) assumes an insight or understanding of which future problems can give rise to use of the document in question. The reason for this lies in two assertions: l. any document possesses an infinite number of properties (so that it is not possible to count them all); 2. the properties which are central to one context need not be so in another (thus a fixed set of priorities cannot be established once and for all, as the example from Ranganathan's system illustrated).
Epistemology has something relevant to say on what it means'to describe'. What does it mean to discribe. for instance, the content of a book? We will touch lightly on the epistemological aspects of this, based on Krober and Segeth [30] . The concept of dlscription is rnosi com-only used about the perceptions of the senses, which are presented in a systematic and ordered way through deliberation and language' A iuccessful description can achieve quite a precise picture ofthe item described. but it can only state how this object is constituted, not why it is constituted.as it is' For the same reason a description keeps to rhe superfcial aspects ofan object, and does^not pursue iir rrrrnrr. including the reasons for its existence. A description is thus a first step in .ognitlo", ,r"itich is later replaced by other modes of cognition that delve deeper into it.-.tt.".. of things. Positivistic epistemology's programme of restricting scientific mittroa to mere desiription of facts is too narrow in relation to the above. Positivism's requirement of a complete description of a phcnomenon is both impossible and uiin-r""5u.y. A complite description is impossible, because the infinite number of prop€rties tf a ptrenomenon would require an infinitely extensive.description. A io-pt.t. descripiion is unnecessary, because both for scientific knowledge as well as for iractical human purposes, an equally detailed description of all significant and insignificant, nffissary and random, general and particular properties and relations is poiitless. What is needed is knowledge of the significant, the gene-ral among the particular,thenecessaryandthetypical. Descriptioncanthereforeonlyfulflitsfunction in the knowledge-gathe;ing process insofar as it is not made absolute and disuete from other means ol cignition, such as explanation, hypothesis, prognosis etc. Description must, indeed, be viewed in the context of other such modes of cognition'
We see no reason to doubt that the very same situation holds regarding the description of the subjects of documents: a 'pure' description of documents without connection to other modes of cogrrition such as hypothesis, prognosis etc. can only extract the more trivial and superficial properties of the document. Comparison of the subject descriptions made by librarians and sociologists of sociological literature, for instance, gives some insight into this situation [3 I ]: because the documents are not merely 'described', but evaluated in relation to their sociological value, the sociologists' judgements on subject were the most precise and useful. It is banal to discover that the better the qualifications one has in an academic discipiine, the better the judgements made on the significant prop€rties of a book from that field; and the reverse is also true: the poorer the qualifications, the more random and superficial the assessment and the properties that are emphasised. We have in this section seen an example of how two epistemological theories (positivism and materialism) view the role of description in the development of knowledge, and we have from this example seen the fundamental role epistemology plays in the evaluation of subjects, and how the same theoretical pioblems that occur in regard to material objects also occur with regard to the role of documents in the development of knowledge.
It is naturally decisive for a theory of subject matter to recognise how to distinguish between the superficial and accidental properties on the one hand, and the significant properties on the other. Once again this is a basic problem of epistemology (as well as a problem of scientific method). Just as it is pointless to describe flora by superficial characteristics (such as colour) instead of meaningful characteristics (for example categorisation in plants with seeds or with spores), it is naturally just as necessary to describe documents according to meaningful rather than superficial characteristics. Thus an epistemological theory which facilitates the development of knowledge in the direction of the substance of things is what is needed. Such a theory stanfu out in sharp contrest to conceptions which are based on research and analvsis of subjects as an algorithm, a 'trick' or an ^pion method. it is rather the method June 1992 THEORY OF'SUBJECT' which should be a reflection of the essence of the object. Matenalistic theory, in contrast to pragmatic theory, is characterised by a broader and more far-sighted interest in epistemoiogy. Realistic and materialistic theory ol'the concept of subject does not merely attempt to soive the iimited problems of here and now. but hopes to contribute the greatest possible consciousness oflong-term consequences. Subjects are not mereiy to be structured in a narrowly instrumental way, but the attempt must be made. for instance, to contribute to a deeper penetration of the sciences into the innermost essence of reality. Subject categories should exhibit this in such a way that they reflect significant and general aspects of reality. In practice it will oJ'ten be the concepts of the sciences with which materialistic subject theory operates, because the sciences are the cognitive organs of society (see Note I 0). Of course. the sciences are naturally neither uncontroversial, objective nor infallible, but. at least as an ideal, the debate about the objectivity of scientific research is a part of science (see Note ll). Thus an analysis of a subject is itself , at its most profound, a part of the scient{ic process of knowledge gathering.This analysis is dependent on contextual factors. including the existing volume of literature and the system of its access points (see Note l2). Nudansk ordbog(l3.uogu""i-"tniains ihatthe word'emne'was borrowed about 1760 from Norwegian,emne,oi'swedish.dmne'; same word as'evne'. It mentions three meaningso|whichontytt,"fi,,,.*oareofinterestinthisconnection:l.materialfor trearmenr in speech o. *.,tiig; tteme; motive; 2. material ('raw material'), which is oartly worked up. e.g. "i;;;?";;;ti;re the final filing' Nrzsvensk ordbok mentions iji,;;;;il ii"iii'rrfi n'.iir'ru* material','so-.ihing to produce out of''
NOTES
.Emne'can be translat.Jlit"'rru:.ct'in English. The coniept of 'subject' has in the Oxford English airtionor'iii"tO.ii,l"". eigfrteen main meanings' It is complicated thattheEnglish'subject'hasmanymeanings'amongthemthe?1nitl'sublekt'(i'e' grammarical ,subject'). Oi tfre eighteen mianings i-n oro the following should be mentioned:
5. The substance of which a thing consists or from which it is made' 7. Logic. a. firat wtricfr has attrilbutes; the thing about wh.ich a judgement ts made.b.Thetermo'pu..ofapropositiono|whichthepredicateisaffirmedor denied. 8.Gram.Thememberorpartofasentencedenotingthatconcerningwhich something is pr.O,.ui.O ii'e' of which a statement is made' a question asked' or a desire express.ol; "-*-i or group of words serting forth that which is spoken about and constituting the'nominative' to a finite verb' 9. Modern Philos. More fully conscrous or thinking subject: The Mind. as the ,subject, in whicn ideas inhere; that to which all mental representations or operations u." uitriUut"al the thinking or cognitive agent: the self or ego (correlative to object sb'6)' (Themeanings5.T,8andgarederivedthroughtheLatin.subjectum'fromAristotle.'s useofroiloxeiptvov,*i.h.t'"meaningsl.thematerialofwhichthethingsconslsu ;.;"bj;;t lor atiributes lqualities); 3' subject for predicates (names))'
10. The subject-matter ot an art or sclence' l2a. That *hi"h i, or may be acted or operated upon: a person or thing towards which action or influencs is directed. or that is the recipient of some treatment' l3a. In a special,seJ sense: that which forms or is ihosen as the matter of thought, consideration, or inquiry; a topic, theme'. The meaning of special concern to us. is of course especially.#14 (and the combinations Ita), tttut is'subject'in the meaning'what a book is about'' This iefinition does nor. however, soive the problem. What does it mean that 'a book is about'the subject.r? According to thi meanings l2a.and. l3a -"and th-e 1i]': n.,.niion"O definitions from Danish and Swedish -we find evidence ot our conceptlon of the concept of 'subject' or 'emne' as being a 'raw material' for humans to act upon' ln German terminology, you will see thit subject indexes and the like in libraries' books etc. are often callei""sach-' or'Fachregistei'.
'Fach'is a reference to professions or scientific disciplines. That means that in German there is a direct connectlon U"t*..n the terminology used for our 'subject' and the social groups which may be uring rtior" documentsl That is, the concept of 'subject' has no.Precrse equivalent tn
Geriran, but the corresponding concepts underline the function to rel-er documents to categories of users.
--if;" .iy-ofogical meaning of 'raw material' underlines the fact that it is not the innat. piop".tils in the thirigs themselves, but their functions for the human user' which make uP'subjects'. (In the article I hive compared the concept of 'subject' with the concept of 'value''
This gives a better grasp on the meaning of 'subject': gold hasits value.not from the .ft.-i.uf properties-in themselues (they ire necessary: that gold is 'precious' is partly a". i" itti f"tt rhat ir is noi easily coiroded by chemical influences)' but because of ,p*i"f .ri,*"f conditions. The'value'is not a built-in property in things but is still a function of the properties of the things and of the human culture') Thus we have seln that our concJption of the concept of'subject' in.library and information science is not in contrast to important meanings in general language' Il such a contrast had existed, our position would have been weakened because we then ;;
;;G"; for a special usage'of the word. of course we are not claiming rhar the l.n.rut.Jn""pt '.-n.' or'subjict' cannot have other meanings too. as seen in otrD. but i. ..ptt"rir.one side of the ioncept which supports our theoretical points. Note 5 There are other predicates of the second degree than the assignment of subject' If, for example, a document is said to be characterised by belonging to the structuralist i.nooj, iand this judgement is indeed made directly from.the properties of the document), this is i mJta-description which is not identical with a subject descrrptton' ["i*igfril"-etimes be a part oi a description of subject. (lf an assignment of subject is l9r JOURNAL OF DOCUMENTATION vol. 48. no. 2 based on such a secondary attribute it may itself become an attribute of the third degree. but that does not have to be dealt with here)'
Note 6 nt for the conceDt ofsubi 'concept" Another concept significant for the concept of subject is the very concept ol ln the last twenty years significant changes have taken place regarding concepts in iesearctr *itttin piyittotogylphilosophy and linguistics. These developments cannot be ,"--u"r.O here.'but thJV are of greai importince for the meaning of the concept of ift. r"U:."i-One result is ihat some concepts today must be viewed as the result ol an inOuctive argument. Smith [34, p" 5l8l gives the following example:
The animal originaily had typical bird properties' The animal accidentally acquired typical insect properties' The animal produced offspring with typical bird propertles'
This animal is ProbablY a bird.
That is. human beings, when faced with a problem of categorisatio-n..are capable of .i.-G uUou" similaritles and employing deductions, which require a facility for further "rrrilpiit"r. This is in direct conflict with the view expressed by Beghtol [35' p. 95-961 tt"i tft" classifier judges the class relationship on the basis of similarities betx'een documents. Here w,e are proposing rhe view that just tts modern research in concepts has gii" brvona similaritv ai the onll,valid criterion in the view ol'concept' it is 'correspontlingly necessary to move be1'ond tlrc similarity o.f documents as the onl)' cr ite r ion fo r subje ct re lat ions hip s.
il?j"rrl, "-*nence rhat many people view this discussion as unnecessanly complicated. *ttV-it it not possible to graip subjects as more tangible properties of documents'? This does of course work in mosi cases. But it is my view that in particular work on the concept ofsubject in psychology and the social sciences necessitates a far more abstract una co-pti"ated conception oTsubject than that which previously has been discussed in I-IS titirature. Examples are givJn in the appendix to deepen understanding of the p.Ji"-r otsubject analysis in piychol-ogy_ and the social sciences. It is noteworthy that ihe criticisms oi other ioncepiions of subject (for example 'aboutness'),often come iio-p..ronr with a background in the-social sciences. 1cf. Swift et al-136\). This does not, oi "our.., mean that ih" .on".pt of subject proposed here only has validity for the social sciences. Rather, the needs oi the social sciences contribute to a generalisation of If,. ."..ip, of subject in such a way that will be fruitful in other areas' A general information scienci theory has to be based on such a generalisation ofexperience and theories within specific disciplines (as opposed to the opposite: that a finished theory be forced on specific fields)' Note 8 i o*" the e*p.ession'it is the human practice that constitutes a subject'to my colleagueAnders Orom. who coined it in reiponse to an oral presentation of my theory of subject.
Note 9 iirir r.t"tionthip leads us to a new question: are there documents without subjects? In theory one has io answer no to this question; we cannot imagine documents without "-ny "6gnitiu" potential. And it is a rare experience to consider in practice not assigning un' rrfij.", designation. In specific cases thelack ofclear possibilities for classification usually r"nectslhat the document in question was inappropriate for-acquisition or inclusion in the particular database. Thus the lack ofa'subject'usually expresses an inconsistency between policies of accession and indexing' Unfortunitely a coniradiction in subject descriptions can occur. Documents which correspond to a classification system (or IR language) receive single, or few, classifications, which correspond to the respective category in the system. Vague or cross-cutting documents often receive far more classifications and thus achieve an unintended uisiUitity. This phenomenon ought to be contained. Information systems ought to provide optimal use of the knowledge in the collected mass of documents. In the-above case a document achieves visibility at the expense ofother documents: ifall documents were placed in all categories all value of categorisation would be null and void. Rare situations can thus also occur where a subject description of a document does more harm than benefit. and such descriptions should be avoided.
Note l0
In addition to subject analysis for scientific/scholarly purposes. subject analysis of a more pragmatic nature also exists. Subject analysis of documents does not always have to be-viewed as a scientific process of cognition. even though scientific perception/ cognition often naturally extends into, and becomes relevant to, more ordinary peiception. This view on the role ol scientific disciplines is in opposition to many information scientists. who try to avoid scientific disciplines and instead -as, for example, the Classification Research Group -describe documents according to 'more fundamental semantic categories'.
Note I I This emphasis on disciplines rather than 'forms of knowledge' or 'topics' represents an alternative to a widespread viewpoint represented in library science, for example in Langridge's recent book Subject anal.vsis [3fl. Because this book represents a different theory about subject analysis. I shall give a short comment on it.
Langridge analyses the concept of subject in two major components:
(a) Central to his book is the thesis that fundamental categories of knowledge exist. Thes" ure the philosophical categories, which go back to Plato and Aristotle. introduced to LIS especially by S.R. Ranganathan. Langridge prefers the expression 'forms of knowledge' to these fundamental categories.
There are relatively few 'forms of knowledge'; Langridge lists twelve, for example Philosophy, Natural science. Technology, Human (behavioural or social) science. History, Religion, Art, Criticism and Personal experience.
(b) Beside these'forms of knowledge' Langridge operates with'topics', which are'the phenomena that we perceive'. Where'human science'is a'form of knowledge','human behaviour' is a toPic.
Besides the two fundamental components, a third one exists:
(c) the concept of discipline (or 'field of learning') (p. 3l ): unfortunately, this extremely important distinction has been blurred in many people's minds by the existence of a third kind of term which combines both form of knowledge and topic. For example. ethics is the philosophy (form) of morals (topic); zoology is the science (lorm) of animals (topic); psychology is the science (form) of human behaviour (topic;.
Langridge does not like the concept of scientific disciplines as a concept in subject analysis. They are unstable: '. . . the disciplines that constitute specialisations may be unstable, but the fundamental disciplines, or forms of knowledge' are not. The specialisations are a practical convenience for sharing the world's intellectual labours: the forms are pennanent, inherent characteristics of knowledge' (p. 32)" Langridge's concept of subject takes the above mentioned 'fundamental components' as point of departure for subject analysis. It does nol make reference to the user context, to the 'pragmatic viewpoint' o[ subject analysis.
In my classification of conceptions of 'subject', Langridge's theory -in the tradition of Ranganathan -must be labelled 'objective idealistic'.
My own viewpoint differs in more ways: t93
